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Aaron’s Law: Reactionary Legislation in
the Guise of Justice
Matthew Aaron Viana
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 214
ABSTRACT
This Note argues that the proposed amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act dubbed “Aaron’s Law,” created in the wake of the prosecution and subsequent
suicide of hacktivist Aaron Swartz, should not be enacted as it is overly reactionary
legislation which would have unfortunate and unjust repercussions in the realm of
civil litigation. This Note first describes the circumstances under which Mr. Swartz
found himself prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, namely his
intrusion into, and downloading massive amounts of data from, large internet
databases like PACER and JSTOR. This Note also explores the disputed
interpretation of the CFAA phrase “exceeds authorized access” by the Circuit Courts
of Appeal and according to the maxims of statutory interpretation, the particular
phrase which Aaron’s Law seeks to amend. Then this Note examines Robbins v.
Lower Merion School District, a case utilizing the existing language of the CFAA.
Amending the language as proposed by Aaron’s Law would potentially remove a
civil remedy in Robbins. This Note concludes that prosecutorial discretion should be
used in cases like Aaron Swartz’s, so as to allow the CFAA to function as intended
by Congress and to provide the Robbins plaintiffs, and similarly situated individuals,
a meaningful remedy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he federal indictment and subsequent suicide of computer
programmer and hacktivist1Aaron Swartz sparked tremendous
controversy surrounding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”)2. Aaron Swartz was charged with eleven counts of violating
the CFAA for allegedly downloading and distributing a substantial
portion of JSTOR’s digitized academic journal archive.3 The CFAA
criminalizes, among other things, activities which stem from
“knowingly access[ing] a computer without authorization or
exceed[ing] authorized access.”4 This is, arguably, broad language that
could encompass a wide range of computer activities. An
implementation based on its broad language makes this provision of
the CFAA unfortunately vulnerable to possible injustice. Aaron was a
victim of such injustice. However, the broad language of the CFAA
has its merits and should not be amended by way of reactionary
legislation crafted in the guise of justice.
The statutory language, “knowingly accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access,” itself, has been subject to
varying interpretations.5 There is a Circuit split regarding the meaning
of both phrases: “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access” under the CFAA. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have each held that the CFAA broadly covers violations of corporate
computer use restrictions.6 In contrast, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits
have narrowly interpreted “exceeds authorized access” so as not to
1

2

3

4
5
6

“Hacktivist” is a portmanteau of the words “hacker” and “activist,” employed to
describe an individual who uses hacking skills to further activist goals.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2014) (The CFAA is a statute that provides
civil and criminal penalties and targets the practices of computer hacking and
misappropriation of information.).
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Swartz, No. 11-CR-10260-NMG (D.
Mass. 2012). Available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012
/09/swartzsuperseding.pdf.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2) (2014).
See, supra, Part III.
See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010) (Social Security
employee convicted for using computer access to access records for personal
reasons); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2010) (bank employee
convicted for use of computer access to transmit account numbers to
accomplice); and Int’l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006)
(employee convicted for using corporate files on company laptop for purposes
of setting up a competing business).
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include mere violations of corporate computer restrictions.7 Depending
on the jurisdiction, it is arguable regarding whether the statute allows a
computer user to be federally indicted for minor crimes such as
breaching a terms of service agreement.8
Aaron’s Law, proposed on June 20, 2013, would amend the
CFAA, eliminating the “exceeds authorized access” provision.9 It
would further define “access without authorization” to include only
obtaining “information on a protected computer,” that the “accesser
lacks authorization to obtain,” by “knowingly circumventing one or
more technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude
or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining or altering that
information.”10 Therefore, Aaron’s law would decriminalize violations
of an agreement, policy, duty, or contractual obligation regarding
computer use, such as a terms of service agreement.
Aaron’s Law, if enacted, would be a prime example of reactionary
legislation providing a disservice to harmed individuals in the civil
arena. It would eviscerate an essential provision contained in the
CFAA, reversing legislative history, raising policy concerns, and, as
this note emphasizes, leave harmed plaintiffs with one less avenue for
recovery. Keeping in mind the dual nature of the CFAA, having both
civil and criminal components, if Aaron’s law was to be enacted and
the CFAA deprived of the full force of its current wording, the effects
would be felt in both arenas. While hackstivists such as Aaron may
have benefitted from the different standard of the proposed
amendment, the repercussions felt by victims in the civil arena would
be unfortunate and unjustified.
This Note proposes that Aaron’s Law should not be enacted
because the impact of such reactionary legislation, prompted by
prosecutorial indiscretion, exacts too high a toll on victims in the civil
7

8

9
10

See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (employees
transmitting corporate information to ex-employee did not exceed authorized
access as the employees had full access to the information); WEC Carolina
Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (former
employee downloading and using corporate information for benefit of
competitor is not exceeding authorized access for purposes of CFAA).
Terms of service agreements, or terms and conditions agreements, are
ubiquitous and usually encountered when creating online accounts, from email
to LinkedIn accounts. They usually are accompanied by a checkbox with the
text “I agree.”
Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013).
Id.
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arena who are seeking relief under a statute uniquely suited to everevolving computer technology. The language of the CFAA, as it
currently exists, is well suited to be used as necessitated by pervasive,
potentially damaging and evolving security vulnerabilities.
Prosecutorial overreach as regrettable as it is, should not result in a
limiting effect upon victims in the civil arena who have been harmed
and should be entitled to specific and varied avenues of recovery. Part
II of this Note provides a background of Aaron Swartz’s rise as a
prominent hacktivist and the unfortunate results of his indictment. Part
III discusses the current Circuit split as well as cases interpreting the
CFAA. Part IV discusses the case of Robbins v. Lower Merion School
District, which demonstrates a circumstance to which the CFAA’s
broad language is well suited.11 It is in light of the CFAA’s legislative
history, its interpretation by the Circuit Courts of Appeal and its real
life impact in society as illustrated by Aaron’s story, that this Note
questions the soundness of legislation proposed under the guise of
preventing the type of injustice that occurred in the case against Aaron.
II. AARON SWARTZ AND HIS LEGACY
A. Aaron Hillel Swartz
According to his obituary, Aaron Swartz was a programmer and
“open-data crusader.”12 By the age of fourteen he had helped develop
RSS software, which enables syndication of information on the
internet.13 The following year, he wrote code for Creative Commons,
which promotes alternatives to standard copyright licenses.14 At
nineteen years of age, Aaron was a developer of the social networking
news website Reddit, which is perhaps his best known, and certainly
most utilized, project.15 However, it was his conduct regarding his title
as an “open-data crusader,” that earned him the name recognition
attributed to him today.
11

12

13

14
15

Complaint, Robbins v. Lower Marion School Dist., 2010 WL 581739 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 16, 2010) No. 10CV00665 (hereinafter “Robbins Complaint”).
See Jack Schofield, Obituary of Aaron Swartz, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 13 2013,
2:22 P.M.), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/13/aaron-swartz.
See Larissa MacFarquhar, Requiem For a Dream, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 11,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/03/11/130311fa_fact_macfarquhar.
See id.
See id.
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After his success developing Reddit, Aaron became a political
activist, focusing on open access to academic information. He penned
the well-known—in the open-access world— Guerilla Open Access
Manifesto in July, 2008.16 Later in his life, Aaron went on to fight
against anti-piracy legislation in furtherance of his position regarding
open-access to data on the internet.17 By this time in his career as an
activist, Aaron had already, allegedly, taken actions that placed him at
serious odds with federal anti-hacking law.
B. PACER & RECAP
To better understand Aaron’s motives and to better appreciate the
negative ramifications of enacting Aaron’s Law, it is important to
briefly discuss Aaron’s work advancing open access before the
“MIT/JSTOR Incident”18 that ultimately led to Aaron’s federal
indictment and subsequent suicide. In 2008, Aaron began work on a
project that bears resemblance to the actions he took with JSTOR’s
database.19 At the time, however, public court records were Aaron’s
target, as opposed to academic documents.20 The court records Aaron
sought to liberate are digitally stored by the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records system, or PACER, which is an electronic public
access web service that provides users with case and docket
information from Federal Appellate, District and Bankruptcy courts.21
On top of regular fees, PACER charges $0.10 per page retrieved.22
16

17

18

19

20
21

22

Aaron Swartz, Guerilla Open Access Manifesto, (Jul. 2008),
http://ia600808.us.archive.org/17/items/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjul
y2008.pdf.
Daniel Wagner and Verena Dobnik, Swartz’ Death Fuels Debate Over
Computer Crime, The Associated Press (Jan. 13, 2013, 8:25 P.M.),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/swartz-death-fuels-debate-over-computer-crime.
The MIT/JSTOR Incident refers to allegations that, in 2011, Aaron Swartz
illegally accessed JSTOR archives at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT). JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals. See New to JSTOR?
Learn more about us, JSTOR.ORG, http://about.jstor.org/10things (describing
JSTOR’s mission and designed functions). For additional discussion of the
MIT/JSTORR Incident, see infra Section IIC.
Sam Klein, Aaron Swartz vs. United States, THE LONGEST NOW (Jul. 24, 2011,
11:04 P.M.) http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/sj/2011/07/24/aaron-swartz-v-unitedstates/.
See id.
Frequently Asked Questions, PACER.GOV, http://www.pacer.gov/psc/hfaq.html
(last visited Sep. 20, 2014).
See id.

220

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 214

According to PACER, the case information made available to its users
is a matter of public record and, as such, can be reproduced without
permission.23
There are some open-access advocates who deride the fact that
access to the court documents is subject to an out-of-date fee-based
service.24 PACER was, after all, originally designed to provide
electronic access to court records in 1988.25 . In 2007, four years after
the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) first requested non-fee
access to PACER, the Judicial Conference approved and instituted a
one-year pilot to assess the effects of free public access to PACER
documents.26 The pilot program provided free public access to Federal
court records at seventeen depository libraries.27 Although slated to
run for up to twenty-four months, the pilot would abruptly end just
eleven months after its inception.28 Even a Senator, Joe Lieberman of
Connecticut, wrote to the judiciary inquiring as to whether PACER’s
fee structure complies with the legislation that funds the service.29
According to Senator Lieberman, the fees collected by PACER are
higher than the cost of dissemination.30 This has resulted in a surplus
of funds coming into the Judiciary Information Technology Fund as a
result of fees being charged for obtaining public information.31
Enter Carl Malamud, an open-government advocate who is the
President and Founder of Public.Resource.Org, a website which aims

23
24

25

26

27
28
29

30
31

See id.
See John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and
Easy, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02
/13/us/13records.html?_r=0 (Malamud stating “The system is 15 to 20 years out
of date.”).
See id. (discussing the origins of PACER); see also Timothy B. Lee, The inside
story of Aaron Swartz’s campaign to liberate court fillings, ARS TECHNICA (Feb.
8, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/the-inside-story-of-aaronswartzs-campaign-to-liberate-court-filings/.
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), FDLP.GOV (Oct. 25,
2012), http://www.fdlp.gov/23-about/projects/140-pacer (last updated July 23,
2104).
Id.
Id.
Joseph Lieberman, Letter to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal (Feb. 27, 2009),
https://public.resource.org/scribd/13252410.pdf.
See id.
See id.
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to make “government information more available.”32 Malamud
encouraged fellow activists to go to the pilot libraries, where PACER
access was free to the public, download as many documents as
possible, and send them to him for publication on the internet. 33 Aaron
answered Malamud’s call to arms. Aaron recruited a friend to visit one
of the pilot libraries where he extracted an authentication cookie 34 set
by PACER’s site.35 This authentication cookie was not tied to any
specific IP address.36 Thus, the authentication cookie could be used by
any computer on the internet to access the PACER service for free as
if it were located in a pilot library.3738
On September 29, 2009, it came to the attention of court
administrators that the pilot library in Sacramento, while receiving the
free service, would have accumulated a $1.5 million PACER bill.39 By
the time the hack was discovered and the pilot program was
suspended, Aaron had downloaded 2.7 million documents from
PACER.40 Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Justice investigated Aaron’s actions but filed no
charges.41 Today, those looking to obtain court documents from
PACER without paying fees may do so by downloading a Firefox
extension, known as RECAP, which searches for free copies of
32

33
34

35
36
37

38
39
40
41

PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG-A501(C)(3) NONPROFIT CORPORATION, https://public
.resource.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
Schwartz, supra note 24.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (11th ed. 2004) ([a cookie
is] a small file or part of a file stored on a World Wide Web user’s computer,
created and subsequently read by a Web site server, and containing personal
information (as a user identification code, customized preferences, or a record of
pages visited)).
Lee, supra note 25.
See id.
Malamud did not support Swartz’s use of an authentication cookie. An email to
Swartz from Malamud reads “[T]his is not how we do things. . .[W]e don’t cut
corners, we belly up to the bar and get permission.” Malamud told Swartz that if
they were going to access PACER documents from sites other than the pilot
libraries, then they would need a valid account and should pay the PACER fees,
available at https://public.resource.org/aaron/pub/msg00197.html.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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documents already uploaded by other users.42 In its development
RECAP was pre-loaded with the documents Swartz obtained from the
PACER service.43 Aaron’s work with PACER was, indeed, an
important first step toward breaking down the “paywall” that hinders
full public access to court documents online.
C. The MIT/JSTOR Incident and the CFAA Violation
On January 6, 2011, Aaron allegedly broke into an MIT building
where he infiltrated a closet containing computer networking
equipment.44 The networking equipment in this closet could provide
access to MIT’s computer network, as well as access to JSTOR
archives, to those who are savvy enough to perform the functions
necessary to access that information.45 JSTOR is a not-for-profit
digital library designed to help university and college libraries.46 The
subsequent prosecution alleged that Aaron broke into this closet in
order to access and download a substantial portion of JSTOR’s archive
of digitized academic journal articles.47 An estimated four million
academic articles were downloaded from subscription-based JSTOR as
a result of the network breach.48
A federal indictment was filed on September 12, 2012 alleging that
Aaron contrived to, among other things, violate the CFAA.49 The
CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to any “protected computer,”
which is defined as any computer “in or affecting interstate commerce
or communication.”50 Although the CFAA punishes seven activities,

42

43
44

45
46

47
48

49
50

Bobbie Johnson, Recap: cracking open US courtrooms, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
11,
2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/nov/11/recap-uscourtrooms.
Lee, supra note 25.
See Application for Criminal Complaint (Jan. 7, 2011), http://mitcrimeclub.org
/SwartzFilings-state.pdf.
See id.
New to JSTOR? Learn more about us (Sep. 20, 2014), http://about.jstor.org
/10things (describing JSTOR’s mission and designed functions).
Application for Criminal Complaint, supra note 44.
See Alleged Hacker Charged With Stealing Over Four Million Documents From
MIT Network, US ATT’Y’S OFFICE DISTRICT OF MASS (Jul. 19, 2011), available
at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/07/Swartz-AaronPR.pdf .
See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Swartz, supra note 3.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012); Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).

2014

Aaron's Law

223

its most important criminal provision is Section (a)(2)(C).51 This
section provides that any person who “intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and
thereby obtains information from any protected computer” violates the
CFAA.52 However, the CFAA does not define “exceeds authorized
access,” providing no guidance to distinguish between authorized and
unauthorized forms of computer use.
Consequently, Aaron’s actions constituted unauthorized access in
violation of the CFAA. This indictment exposed Aaron to an
extraordinary and disproportionate level of criminal liability in the
range of thirty-five to fifty years imprisonment and approximately one
million dollars in fines.53 Regardless of which estimate is more
accurate, it is certain that Aaron Swartz was living with the possibility
of losing, in a practical sense, the very principle that he had been
fighting for so fervently: freedom.
On January 11, 2013, two years to the day after his arrest on the
indictment, Aaron committed suicide by hanging himself in his
apartment.54 Following this event, his family stated it was not merely a
personal tragedy but “the product of a criminal justice system rife with
intimidation and prosecutorial [sic] overreach.”55 They further
intimated that “[d]ecisions made by officials in the Massachusetts U.S.
Attorney’s Office and at MIT contributed to his death.”56 Needless to
51

52
53

54

55

Such proscribed activities include: obtaining information concerning national
defense or foreign relations; the unauthorized/exceeds authorized access of
information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or
information from a US Department or Agency; the obtainment of information in
furtherance of a fraud; transmission of a program or code to cause damage to
computer systems; communications threatening damage to systems for the
purposes of extortion. See 18 U.S.C. 1030 §(a_(1)-(7).
Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
Compare Senate Request for Brief from Attorney General Eric Holder (2013),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2013-0128-DEI-EEC-to-Holder-re-Aaron-Schwartz-prosecution.pdf (indicating 50 years
imprisonment and $1 million in fines), with US ATT’Y’S OFFICE DISTRICT OF
MASS Press Release, supra note 48, (indicating 35 years imprisonment and $1
million in fines).
See Joe Kemp et al., Aaron Swartz, co-founder of Reddit and online activist,
hangs himself in Brooklyn apartment, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/co-founder-reddit-hangs-brooklynapartment-article-1.1238852 (discussing the timing of Aaron’s death).
See id.
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say, Aaron’s legacy has continued to have an impact in the world of
open-access activism.57
D. Introducing Aaron’s Law: An Attempt to Limit the Broad
Language of the CFAA
In January 2013, in the wake of Aaron’s suicide, United States
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA 19th District) posted drafts of a bill
she dubbed “Aaron’s Law” to solicit public feedback.58 In June 2013,
Lofgren submitted a final version of the proposed amendment H.R.
2454.59 Lofgren cites Aaron’s victimization by overzealous
prosecution under the CFAA as the inspiration for its overhaul.60 The
Congresswoman further indicated that the law must distinguish
between everyday internet activity and criminal activity designed to
cause serious damage to public or private business.61 In her proposed
law, Congresswoman Lofgren aimed to establish that the mere breach
of terms of service, employment agreements, or contracts would not be
considered to be violations of the CFAA.62
Aaron’s Law radically changes the CFAA, as it removes the phrase
“exceeds authorized access” and replaces it with “access without
authorization.”63 Aaron’s Law then goes on to define the phrase
“without authorization” as “knowingly circumvent[ing] one or more
technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or
prevent unauthorized individuals” from accessing particular
information.64 This law, in turn, significantly narrows the scope of
conduct that qualifies as hacking. One of its effects would be to limit a
prosecutor’s ability to charge a computer user under the CFAA with
severe penalties for minor infractions.65
56
57
58

59

60
61
62
63
64
65

See id.
This note itself exists as a result of Aaron’s legacy.
Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, a Desperately Needed
Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, (Jun. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here/.
Zoe Lofgren, Rep Zoe Lofgren Introduces Bipartisan Aaron’s Law, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES PRESS RELEASES (Jun. 20, 2013), http://lofgren.house.gov
/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=365647.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013).
Id.
See id.
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It is unclear whether Aaron’s law would have prevented the
injustice Aaron suffered had its provisions been in effect when he
downloaded and disseminated the JSTOR documents. Put another
way, could Aaron have been charged with violating of the CFAA if the
amendment proposed in his name had been in effect when he
downloaded the JSTOR documents? In order to analyze the question,
however, we must also ask: were Aaron’s actions “everyday internet
activity” of the type that Congresswoman Lofgren cites in her goals
for the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act? If Aaron’s actions were not
“everyday internet activity,” then where should the line be drawn?
III. THE CFAA CIRCUIT SPLIT: CASE LAW INTERPRETING
“EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED ACCESS”
There is currently a circuit split as to whether the term “exceeds
authorized access,” as defined in the CFAA, should be interpreted
broadly or narrowly.66 This section will explore the majority of Circuit
Courts of Appeal which have ruled on the issue and have interpreted
the meaning of the phrase broadly.67
A. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.
The First Circuit, in the case of EF Cultural Travel BV v.
Explorica, Inc., found that an employee who was in breach of a broad
confidentiality agreement prohibiting certain use of company
information was exceeding authorized access.68 In EF Cultural, an
employer sued former employees under the CFAA based on
allegations that the former employees, who now worked for EF’s
competitor, Explorica, used their knowledge of EF’s system to design
a program that would gather information about EF’s pricing for the
purpose of undercutting its business.69 The former employees
previously had access to that kind of information.70 The court ruled
66

67

68
69
70

See generally Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Exceeding
Authorized Access in the Workplace: Prosecuting Disloyal Conduct Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 285 (2013).
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001),
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2010); and Int’l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440
F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
See id.
See id.
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that the former employees’ access under the circumstances of the
confidentiality agreement, however, exceeded their authorized
access.71
B. International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin
The Honorable Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
expounded on the approach found in EF Culture in finding that an
employee was without authorization once he violated a duty of loyalty
to his employer.72 In Int’l Airport, an outgoing employee deleted files
from a company laptop and loaded a secure erasure program onto the
computer that prevented recovery of the system’s memory.73 Even
though the defendant’s employment agreement allowed him to “return
or destroy” data on the laptop, the court found that his authorization
terminated when his conduct went against the interests of his
employer, and furthermore violated the duty of loyalty that he owed to
his employer.74
C. United States v. Rodriquez
In U.S. v. Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
found that the defendant had exceeded his authorization of computer
access when he accessed personal information in his employer’s
database for non-business reasons.75 The defendant argued that
because he accessed only databases and because he was authorized to
use the database as an employee, he had not exceeded his authorized
access.76 The court emphasized that the defendant’s access had
violated his employer’s policy.77
D. United States. v. John
In United States v. John, the Fifth Circuit held that authorization,
for purposes of the CFAA, “may encompass limits placed on the use
of information obtained by permitted access to a computer system and

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See id.
Int’l Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
See id.
See id.
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
See id.
See id.
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data available on that system.”78 The defendant was charged with
violating § 1030(a)(2) based on her misappropriation of customer
information to commit fraud.79 The defendant contended that the
statute does not prohibit unlawful use of information that was obtained
through authorized access.80 In its ruling, the court focused on the fact
that the defendant was aware of company policies against such use and
acted in violation of those.81
IV. THE FOLLY IN AARON’S LAW
Aaron’s law, though motivated by good intentions, imposes too
great a cost on plaintiffs in the civil arena. The narrowing effect that
Aaron’s law would have on the CFAA’s justifiably broad language
could remove the possibility of a cause of action under the CFAA for
plaintiffs who have been the victims of serious hacking.
A. Robbins v. Lower Merion School District: Removing a
Remedy at Law
The current language of the CFAA provides for a civil cause of
action under its provisions.82 Aaron’s law would narrow the scope of
activity that is actionable under the CFAA’s provisions and,
consequently, remove a potential cause of action that currently exists
for the benefit of individuals who have been a victim of hacking. One
particularly illustrative case is Robbins v. Lower Merion School
District.83 Robbins is noteworthy not only because of its unsettling
facts, but because it is an instance where the CFAA was used as a
cause of action by users against their administrator.84 All of the cases
surveyed in Part III of this Note arise from an administrator or the
government bringing an action against a user.85 The change in
78
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81
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See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Access to a
computer and data that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the
purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2014).
Robbins Complaint, supra note 11.
See generally id. (noting that the use of the CFAA in a civil matter, by a user
against administrators).
See generally id. (noting the use of the CFAA in a civil mater, by a user against
administrators); see also generally LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1172
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dynamic brings up a fundamental point that is missed by the
proponents of Aaron’s Law: the CFAA is, and should be used as, a
tool for justice and not, as was Aaron’s experience, a disproportionate
response to questionably illegal hacktivism.
Robbins was a class action suit brought against a school district for
allegedly spying on minor children in their homes via laptop
webcams.86 The laptops were issued to students of Lower Merion
School District as part of the District’s “one-to-one” laptop program
which is described by the District itself as “one of the first in the
nation.”87 All ninth grade students within the School District were
issued laptops that they were allowed to keep for the duration of their
high school career.88 The Lower Merion School District’s practice was
to load a program called LANrev on all laptops in order to remotely
manage and track misplaced and stolen one-to-one laptops.89 In case of
loss or theft, LANrev allowed school officials to turn on the lost or
stolen laptop’s webcam to snap photos and take screenshots of the
laptop’s surroundings.90 According to the complaint, the School
District made no reference to the fact that it could remotely activate
the webcams without notice.91 In fact, the LANrev software apparently
disabled the cameras for users, leading the students to believe that the
camera was just for show.92
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(noting that the action was brought by an administrator) and United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that this action is a criminal
matter brought against a user).
Douglas Stanglin, School district accused of spying on kids via laptop webcams,
USA TODAY, (Feb. 18, 2010, 5:42 PM), http://content.usatoday.com
/communities/ondeadline/post/2010/02/school-district-accused-of-issuingwebcam-laptops-to-spy-on-students/1#.UscG8vRDsrU.
Lower Merion School District, One to One, LMSD.ORG (last visited Sep. 8,
2014), http://www.lmsd.org/academics/instructional-tech/one-to-one/index.aspx.
See id.
Bill Detwiler, LANrev to lose Theft Track feature following Pa. School spying
allegations, TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 23, 2010, 1:20 PM PST), http://archive.is
/5Lct.
Chloe Albanesius, Another Lawsuit Filed Over School Webcam Spying,
PCMAG, (Jul. 30, 2010). http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2367209,00
.asp.
Robbins Complaint, supra note 11.
Jeff Porten, School District Faces Lawsuit Over Webcam Spying Claims,
PCWORLD, (Feb. 23, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/190101
/article.html.
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The School District’s procedures for activating the tracking
software were at best unorganized, and at worst abused or neglected.
Approximately ten school officials had authorization to activate the
tracking.93 There were a handful of cases in which a laptop was
recovered but the webcam tracking remained active for weeks after,
snapping photos of unsuspecting minor students.94 An investigator for
the School District indicated that, in approximately one dozen cases, it
wasn’t apparent why the webcam was activated at all.95 Students
reported the webcam’s green light turn on, signaling that the webcam
had been activated, but they dismissed the phenomenon as a glitch.96
By the time the tracking was brought to light, approximately 56,000
images had been captured by laptop webcams without students’
knowledge.97
Lower Merion’s clandestine laptop tracking program had gone
largely undetected until November of 2009. According to the
complaint, it was on November 11, 2009, that the plaintiffs were, for
the first time, informed of the capability and practice of the School
District concerning LANrev webcam tracking.98 On that day, the
plaintiff was approached by Harriton High School’s Assistant
Principal Lindy Matsko. 99 Matsko informed the plaintiff that the
School District believed he had engaged in improper behavior in his
home.100 As proof of such behavior, Matsko cited as evidence a
photograph that had been taken by the plaintiff’s School District issued
laptop.101 Matsko further informed the plaintiff of the School District’s
ability to remotely activate the webcam he had kept in his room at
home.102
Among other causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged that the School
District had exceeded its authorized access in violation of the CFAA in
93

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

The Associated Press, School took 56,000 images on student laptops, USA
TODAY, (Apr. 20, 2010, 3:18 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation
/2010-04-19-laptop-photos_N.htm. (hereinafter “School took 56,000 images”)
See Stanglin, supra note 86.
See id.
See id.
School took 56,000 images, supra note 93.
Robbins Complaint, supra note 11.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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that it exceeded its authorized access to the plaintiff’s laptop.103 The
plaintiffs requested, and were granted, an injunction prohibiting the
activation of the tracking software.104 The implications of what the
webcam images showed were enormous. The legal director for the
Pennsylvania chapter for the American Civil Liberties Union
commented that “[t]his is fodder for child porn.”105
After litigation, the Lower Merion School District paid
approximately $610,000 to settle Robbins and a companion suit arising
out of similar circumstances.106 The judge ordered that the temporary
injunction prohibiting the activation of laptop computers issued to its
students would be superseded by a permanent injunction to the same
effect.107
Robbins illustrates how the CFAA can be used as a tool by
plaintiffs who deserve a range of counts seeking recovery when
someone has exceeded their authorized access to their computer. The
plaintiffs in Robbins had their privacy interests violated by a complete
abuse of a computer system by the school district. Without the current
language of the CFAA, the plaintiffs would have had one less cause of
action and one less reason for Lower Merion School District to settle.
B. Statutory Interpretation Supports the CFAA’s Broad
Language
Maxims of statutory interpretation support a broad reading of the
CFAA, rather than a narrow reading that Aaron’s Law calls for. Under
the CFAA, “exceeds authorized access” means “to access a computer
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information
in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”108
A narrow interpretation of the phrase may be inconsistent with the last
words of the definition as set forth by Congress in the statute itself:
“obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter.”109 “So” means “in the state or manner
103
104
105
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See id.
Robbins v. Lower Merion School Dist., 2010 WL 3421026 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
FBI Probing School Webcam Spy Case, CBSNEWS, (Feb. 19, 2010, 10:00
AM),http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-probing-school-webcam-spy-case/.
John P. Martin, Lower Merion district’s laptop saga ends with $610,000
settlement, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-1012/news/24981536_1_laptop-students-district-several-million-dollars.
Robbins v. Lower Merion School Dist., supra note 104.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
See id. (emphasis added).
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indicated or expressed.”110 The inclusion of the word “so” in
1030(e)(6) is unambiguous in that someone exceeds authorized access
when he obtains information he is not entitled to obtain or alter under
the circumstances. The word “so” also indicates that the accesser may
have been entitled to obtain the same information for other purposes,
but not for illegitimate purposes that contravene the purpose for which
restricted access is required.
For instance, suppose an employer grants an employee access to all
information on its computer system, but restricts access authority by
indicating that the employee only has permission to access medical
records on the computer system during the workday, with the written
approval of a supervisor. If these circumstances are not present, the
employee is not authorized to access medical records and therefore has
no right to access the medical records. If the employee accesses a
medical record in contravention of his employer’s restrictions, he is
not “entitled so to obtain” such information and has exceeded his
authorized access.
Thus, “exceeds authorized access” indicates that someone exceeds
authorized access by obtaining information in a manner which is
restricted even if the accesser is entitled to obtain the same information
under non-restricted circumstances. There is nothing in §1030 that
purports to allay employer-employee use-based restriction agreements.
Thus, an employee exceeds authorized access if he acts in
contravention of his employer’s use-based access restriction by
obtaining information for a prohibited reason.111
A somewhat unique aspect of the CFAA as a statute is that, besides
criminal penalties, it also provides a civil remedy based upon the same
“without or exceeding authorized access” standard that is applicable to
the criminal penalties.112 This dual nature makes for a delicate balance
when policy and emotion meet, as happened in Aaron’s case.
110
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“So,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/so (last visited Sep. 20, 2014).
See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Access to a
computer and data that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the
purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”); Cont’l Group, Inc. v.
KW Prop. Mgmt, LLC, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1372 (S.D. Fla 2009) (finding a
“substantial likelihood” that defendant exceeded authorization when she
downloaded files for her own purposes, where her employer’s computer access
policies stated that its computers “are provided for business use” and any
equipment is provided “to be used solely for [the employer’s] purposes”).
Id.

232

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 214

Because the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a statute with both
civil and criminal implications, any discussion of possible ambiguities
should touch upon, at least briefly, the possible applicability of the
Rule of Lenity to the statute’s analysis. Generally, when a term in a
criminal statute is ambiguous, that term should be construed narrowly
in favor of the defendant.113 However, the “simple existence of some
statutory ambiguity is not sufficient to warrant application of the rule
of lenity, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”114 Further,
a criminal statute is not improper simply because it might apply to a
broad range of conduct.115 Thus, reliance on the Rule of Lenity to
force a narrow interpretation of the term “exceeds authorized access”
is tenuous.
C. Aaron’s Law Would Reverse Decades of Legislative Intent
The current statutory definition of “exceeds authorized access” was
enacted in 1986.116 The reason for enacting this phrase was to
substitute:
for the more cumbersome phrase in present 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)
and (a)(2), “or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses
the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such
authorization does not extend”. The Committee intends this change
to simplify the language in 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1) and (2), and the
phrase “exceeds authorized access” is defined separately in Section
117
(2)(g) of the bill.

Clearly, the phrase replaced a “more cumbersome” one that
specifically spoke to access in violation of use-based restrictions.
The legislative history of §1030 noted and accepted that the
CFAA, as amended, “specifically covers the conduct of a person
who deliberately breaks into a computer without authority, or an
insider who exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains
classified information and then communicates that information to
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See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1172, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009)
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Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).
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another person, or retains it without delivering it to the proper
118
authorities.

Further, as amended in 1996, the statute intended to close “gaps in
the law to protect better the confidentiality, integrity, and security of
data and networks.”119 Thus, the legislative history shows that
Congress intended the term to have a broad meaning and applicability.
Further, the legislative intent of the word “loss” must be examined,
as for purposes of the CFAA it indicates a broad meaning and
application. The CFAA defines “loss” as
any reasonable cost to any victim, including (1) the cost of
responding to an offense, (2) conducting a damage assessment, and
(3) restoring the data, program, system or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and (4) any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
120
interruption of service.

The legislative history of the 1996 amendments to the CFAA
contemplates that “although there is arguably no ‘damage,’
nevertheless, the victim suffers ‘loss.’”121 Further, it has been noted
that “Congress intended the term ‘loss’ to target remedial expenses
borne by a victim that could not properly be considered direct damage
caused by a hacker.”122 Such broad language leaves significant
discretion to the plaintiff in a civil case or the prosecutor in a criminal
case.
D. Lessig’s Take: Aaron Swartz Did Not Violate the CFAA as
Written
In order to gain a better understanding of the possible implications
of Aaron’s Law on the MIT/JSTOR incident, it will be helpful to
understand Aaron’s actions in light of the theories of Lawrence
Lessig.123 Lessig is an advocate of political beliefs, including such as
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Lawrence Lessig is the Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership at
Harvard Law School, and serves as the director of the Edmond J. Safra Center
for Ethics at Harvard University. Among other accomplishments, Lessig clerked
for Judge Richard Posner on the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as Justice
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the need for a second Constitutional Convention.124 Lessig met Aaron
when Aaron was in his early teens.125 However, Lessig describes
Aaron, who was much younger than him, as his mentor.126
Lessig defines “hacking” as “the use of technical knowledge to
advance a public good.”127 He acknowledges that Aaron was a hacker
while distinguishing the title from a “cracker” or one whose intent is
not to advance public good.128 He and Aaron saw the impediments set
in the way of open-access to information as a kind of social
corruption.129 With his view that social corruption is hampering openaccess to information, Lessig took a sympathetic approach to Aaron’s
actions in the MIT/JSTOR incident.
According to Lessig, Aaron’s actions could not have amounted to
unauthorized access in violation of the CFAA because there was no
traditional “hacking” involved in the MIT/JSTOR incident.130 In
support of this assertion, he explains that Aaron noticed that the URL
on JSTOR’s website ends with a number that references a specific
article.131 When Aaron recognized the pattern, he realized that it would
be simple to write a “script”132 to download all of the articles.133 Aaron
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http://www.lessig.org/about/ (last visited Sep. 4, 2014).
Alesh, Houdek, Has a Harvard Professor Mapped Our the Next Step for Occupy
Wall Street?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/11/has-a-harvard-professor-mapped-outthe-next-step-for-occupy-wall-street/247561/.
Harvard Law School, Lessig on “Aaron’s Laws – Law and Justice in a Digital
Age,” YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2013) available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=9HAw1i4gOU4 (hereinafter “Lessig on Aaron’s Laws”).
See id.
See id.
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A computer script is a list of commands that are executed by a certain program
or scripting engine. Scripts may be used to automate processes on a local
computer or to generate Web pages on the Web. For example, DOS scripts and
VB scripts may be used to run processes on Windows machines, while
AppleScript scripts can automate tasks on Macintosh computers. ASP, JSP, and
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visited Oct. 6, 2014).
Lessig on Aaron’s Laws, supra note 125.
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simply had to write a script that would generate numbers that fall
within the range that JSTOR assigns its articles.134 Aaron was able to
download such a massive volume of documents via this method.135
Lessig explains that when JSTOR noticed the volume of data being
downloaded from Aaron’s single IP address,136 they blocked him.137
Without missing a step, Aaron took a new IP address. 138 JSTOR
became aware of the volume being downloaded on the new IP address,
so they blocked a range of IP addresses.139 Blocking a range of IP
addresses rendered JSTOR practically useless on the MIT campus.140
JSTOR then determined the MAC address of Aaron’s computer.141 A
MAC address is a unique identification number tied directly to a
specific computer.142 Aaron then found a way to “spoof” a new MAC
address.143
Instead of “hacking,” Lessig describes these actions as “technical
tricks” to enable the download of many articles.144 Presumably, Lessig
would even stretch so far as to categorize Aaron’s actions as
134
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Congresswoman Lofgren sees them: everyday internet activity.145
However, even Lessig must admit that, while Aaron was permitted to
download some JSTOR articles by way of the fact that he was a
Harvard fellow, he was not permitted to take all of the articles as it
was almost certainly his intention.146
In exploring Aaron’s motivations for his actions, Lessig points to a
conference that Aaron attended where JSTOR indicated that the cost of
making its database available to the public would be $250,000,000.147
He then contends that this conference is where Aaron began preparing
for the MIT/JSTOR incident.148
E. Other Proposed Reform: The Electronic Frontier
Foundation
Lessig views Aaron’s Law as an incomplete reform.149 He points
to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which proposes three
goals for reform of the CFAA.150 The EFF is a self-proclaimed
champion of the public interest “in every critical battle affecting digital
rights.”151 According to its website, the EFF is made up of lawyers,
political analysts, activists, and technologists, which consequently
places it at the forefront of open-access issues.152 Thus, it has devised
the following three goals for reform of the CFAA.
First, there should be no criminal exposure for violating private
agreements or duties.153 The EFF acknowledges that Aaron’s Law, as
proposed by Lofgren, focuses exclusively on this issue.154 The EFF
claims that it is dangerous for private contracts to be enforceable via
punishment of severe criminal penalties subject to vast prosecutorial
145
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discretion.155 Eviscerating the CFAA by enacting Aaron’s Law,
however, could have unintended consequences, by removing a cause
of action from those seeking justice. The EFF does, however, indicate
that users may face civil or criminal liability under its first proposed
goal for more egregious violations, such as destroying data. 156 This
goal quickly begins to smack of the same prosecutorial discretion
permitted by the CFAA in its current form. Thus, it seems a rather
bland reform.
Second, the EFF proposes that, if one is allowed to access
information, “doing it in an innovative way shouldn’t be a crime.”157 It
claims that, as it is written today, the CFAA exposes users to criminal
liability if they engage in “commonplace ‘circumvention’ techniques
like changing IP addresses, MAC addresses, or browser User Agent
headers.”158 Certainly, as commonplace as the EFF would like to think
those advanced circumvention techniques are, it would be hard pressed
to show that the average user possesses such technical knowledge or
that he even knows it is possible. This hole in the reasoning behind the
second goal is difficult to swallow.
The EFF further contends that “technological barriers increasingly
serve purposes far removed from preventing computer intrusion.”159
Even the most arbitrary of technological barriers, however, at its very
least, serves to prevent intrusion’s unfortunate cousin: misuse.
The third and final goal that the EFF would like to see
accomplished in reforming the CFAA is to make penalties more
proportionate to offenses.160 It contends, correctly, that several
sections of the CFAA are redundant and vulnerable to prosecutors who
seek to pursue multiple offenses based on the same behavior.161 It is
with this proposal that the EFF makes its most reasonable and wellthought out point. Limiting the opportunity for prosecutors to “double
dip” by pursuing multiple offenses based on one act would have
substantially decreased the criminal exposure and possible prison time
Aaron was facing as a result of the MIT/JSTOR incident.162 Further,
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limiting the high proportion of punitive measures imputed to each
violation would have substantially limited the total amount of prison
time Aaron was facing. Regardless, just because sentencing for a first
offense is stiff does not make it any less legal, so long as it complies
with constitutional requirements, which the CFAA undoubtedly does.
There are other circumstances, however, that shine a different light on
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
V. CONCLUSION
When assessing future reform of the CFAA, it is important to take
heed of and contemplate the distinction between situations like the
MIT/JSTOR incident and what happened in Robbins. In Aaron’s case,
the CFAA was abused by means of prosecutorial indiscretion;
smothering him with the stress of a potentially long prison sentence
and vast financial penalties. Aaron was accused of violating the CFAA
by trying to sidestep a network administrator in order to spread access
to knowledge. In Robbins, the CFAA was used as a cause of action by
computer users against an administrator who took liberties with
computer privacy. The soundest approach to the broad language of the
CFAA is not its evisceration, which would have prevented the
plaintiffs in Robbins from alleging a count under the CFAA. The
soundest approach, what justice calls for as it does in the
implementation of all laws, is sound discretion. In essence, we don’t
need to amend the CFAA by way of reactionary, knee-jerk legislation
motivated and driven by prosecutorial indiscretion. The history, both
legislative and common law, behind the CFAA’s broad language
demonstrates sound policy objectives, as is easily illustrated by
Robbins. No, what we need isn’t a change in the law, “we need
prosecutors who know the difference between Aaron and evil.”163
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